Assistant Professor of Finance
2110 Speedway Stop B6600
Austin, TX, 78712
Office: GSB 5.165
Work phone: 512-232-6843
Curriculum Vitae (pdf)
We use panel data on S&P 1500 companies to identify external network connections between directors and CEOs. We find that firms with more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint directors with ties to the CEO. Using changes in board composition due to director death and retirement for identification, we find that CEO-director ties reduce firm value, particularly in the absence of other governance mechanisms to substitute for board oversight. We also find that firms with more CEO-director ties engage in more value-destroying acquisitions. Overall, our results suggest that network ties with the CEO weaken the intensity of board monitoring.
· Translation? The Effect of Cultural Values on Mergers Around the World  with Kenneth R. Ahern and Daniele Daminelli Journal of Financial Economics, 117 (1), 165-189.
- Winner of the Jensen Prize for Corporate Finance and Organizations 2015 JFE Best Paper (second prize)
- Winner of the CEG Research Prize in Corporate Finance at the 2011 Finance Down Under Conference.
We find strong evidence that three key dimensions of national culture (trust, hierarchy, and individualism) affect merger volume and synergy gains. The volume of cross-border mergers is lower when countries are more culturally distant. In addition, greater cultural distance in trust and individualism leads to lower combined announcement returns. These findings are robust to year and country-level fixed effects, time-varying country-pair and deal-level variables, as well as instrumental variables for cultural differences based on genetic and somatic differences. The results are the first large-scale evidence that cultural differences have substantial impacts on multiple aspects of cross-border mergers.
· Shopping for Information? Diversification and the Network of Industries  with Fernando Anjos Management Science, 61 (1), 161-183
We propose and test a view of corporate diversification as a strategy that exploits internal information markets, by bringing together information that is scattered across the economy. First, we construct an inter-industry network using input-output data, to proxy for the economy's information structure. Second, we introduce a new measure of conglomerate informational advantage, named "excess centrality", which captures how much more central conglomerates are relative to specialized firms operating in the same industries. We find that high-excess-centrality conglomerates have greater value, and produce more and better patents. Consistent with the internal-information-markets view, we also show that excess centrality has a greater effect in industries covered by fewer analysts and in industries where soft information is important.
We show that business microloans to U.S. subprime borrowers have a very large impact on subsequent firm success. Using data on startup loan applicants from a lender that employed an automated algorithm in its application review, we implement a regression discontinuity design assessing the causal impact of receiving a loan on firms. Startups receiving funding are dramatically more likely to survive, enjoy higher revenues and create more jobs. Loans are more consequential for survival among subprime business owners with more education and less managerial experience.
· Does Rating Analyst Subjectivity Affect Corporate Debt Pricing?  with Stefan Petry and Geoffrey Tate. - Journal of Financial Economics, 120 (3), 514-538.
We find evidence of systematic optimism and pessimism among credit analysts, comparing contemporaneous ratings of the same firm across rating agencies. These differences in perspectives carry through to debt prices and negatively predict future changes in credit spreads, consistent with mispricing. Moreover, the pricing effects are the largest among firms that are the most opaque, likely exacerbating financing constraints. We find that MBAs provide higher quality ratings; however, optimism increases and accuracy decreases with tenure covering the firm. Our analysis demonstrates the role analysts play in shaping investor expectations and its effect on corporate debt markets.
· Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks  Management Science, Forthcoming.
shows that managers are influenced by their social peers when making corporate
policy decisions. Using biographical information about executives and directors
of U.S. public companies, we define social ties from current and past
employment, education, and other activities. We find that more connections two
companies share with each other, more similar their capital investments are. To
address endogeneity concerns, we find that companies invest less similarly when
an individual connecting them dies. The results extend to other corporate
finance policies. Furthermore, central companies in the social network invest
in a less idiosyncratic way, and exhibit better economic performance.
· Technological Specialization and the Decline of Diversified Firms  with Fernando Anjos. Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
We document a strong decline in corporate-diversification activity since the late 1970's, and we develop a dynamic model that explains this pattern, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The key feature of the model is that synergies endogenously decline with technological specialization, leading to fewer diversified firms in equilibrium. The model further predicts that segments inside a conglomerate should become more related over time, which is consistent with the data. Finally, the calibrated model also matches other empirical magnitudes well: output growth rate, market-to-book ratios, diversification discount, frequency and returns of diversifying mergers, and frequency of refocusing activity.
We investigate the effects of private equity on consumers, using detailed price and sales data for an extensive number of consumer products. We find that manufacturing firms acquired by private equity raise prices marginally---less than 1%---on existing products relative to matched control firms. Overall industry prices rise after buyouts, but again the price increase is on average very modest. More notably, target firms significantly increase sales due to more product additions and greater availability within and across cities. These results are stronger for private firm targets, suggesting that private equity could ease financial constraints and provide the expertise to manage growth. Contrary to the common view that private equity leads to substantial price increases, this evidence suggests that consumers could benefit from private equity deals through an increase in product variety.
Works in Progress
· The Impact of Taxes on Small Businesses , with M. J. Garmaise, G. Natividad, and T. Paligorova.
· Agency problems in rating agencies , with S. Petry, and G. Tate.
· Fintech and Access to Credit , with M. Jansen.
· Empirical Corporate Finance PhD FIN 395 Spring 2016/Spring 2015
· Valuation MBA FIN 286 Spring 2016/Spring 2015/Fall 2013/Spring 2012/Fall 2010/Spring 2010
· Valuation MBA FNCE 728 (Wharton) Fall 2012
· Financial Planning for Large Corporations Undergraduate FIN 374C - Fall 2010